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File "Amos" to DCI"

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13 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : Preparation for Thursday, 19 October
with NIOs on Arms Control Monitoring

1. Attached are the latest tables (numbered 1, 2, & 3) on Arms Control Monitoring. We are suggesting that they serve as a take-off point at the NIO meeting. I have asked Howie Stoertz to serve as moderator. He has hesitated because he's not an expert in all of the negotiations under discussion. However, he has agreed.

2. One of the most contentious concerns is the usage of the relative threat indicator comparing one agreement to another. A description of this indicator is attached as well as it being briefly described in a footnote.

4. For the NIO meeting, procedurally I recommend

a. You open the meeting with a brief statement of the purpose of this exercise along the following lines:

- (1)
- (a) Indicate problem areas
 - (b) Anticipate weaknesses in agreements
 - (c) Show impact of monitoring
 - (d) Bolster collection needs

(2) Bring out issues for policymakers
-Prepare for testimony on Hill

(3) Resolve Community disagreements

b. Howie then chime in with a statement to set the theme along the following lines:

- (1) Intent of charts is to display agreements under consideration
- Recognize data compressed but magnitude of treaties force need to focus
 - Charts are only coordinated within NFAC; need to go to Intelligence Community, but, are we ready?

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(2) Specific NFAC areas of concern on Monitoring Chart:

(a) Minor concerns

-Because negotiations are on-going charts should be updated prior to each use *Yes*

-Compression of information could be misleading; ~~recommend distribution should be limited to DCI to prevent misuse~~ *No*

(b) Significant concerns

-"Uncertainty" levels of E (> 90%) have not been addressed by the Community before *?*

-Conceptually we can do it, but will take some hard work

(c) Major - concern for comparability of data across negotiations

-"Relative Threat" column is the tool to do this, but

-It is difficult to evaluate, all indicators are highly judgmental

-Some risk of going outside the bounds of intelligence into the policy arena *Let's risk*

c. Then you note something to the effect,

-Appreciate the difficulty and delicacy of this, but

-Essential that we put the various weaknesses into perspective

-So let's talk in detail about what these assessments might mean to a policymaker.

d. Hopefully we will then focus on a discussion of the implications of these weaknesses.

5. Because our SALT work is so far ahead of our work for other negotiations, there is a risk that we will focus too much on SALT. I recommend we strive to force our discussion to cover all negotiations.

Attachments

cc: DD/NFA
NIO/SP



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